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Health Law Past and Future: Looking for Stability
in All the Wrong Places
PeterD. Jacobson,J.D., MP.H
Neither the healthcare delivery system nor the
field of health law much resembles the world that the
Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy faced
when it started. At that time, managed care was just
beginning its ascendance and the fee-for-service
system was still dominant. While it would be
reductionist to say that health law was relatively
stable then, it is fair to suggest that the field was far
more stable than it is today. In the interim, the law
has struggled to keep up with the transition to
managed care, and will continue to struggle now with the waning of
managed care and the transition toward a consumer-directed health care
(CDHC) system.
Looking back over this period, four themes occur to me as characterizing
the relationship between law and healthcare delivery: the increasing
complexity of healthcare delivery; elaborate conflicts of interest that
provide a general organizing principle; health law's escalating instability;
and the increasing importance of law in how health care is delivered. These
themes are certainly interdependent, particularly that the system's
complexity leads to instability in the law, but each stands on its own as a
feature to examine. Moving forward, there is no reason to expect stability
any time soon.
I. THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF HEALTHCARE DELIVERY

In 1983, healthcare delivery was hardly the romanticized world of the
physician who makes house calls. Yet, on many dimensions, it was far less
complex than it is today. For example, while both the technological
imperative and the bounty of available pharmaceuticals were well underway
in the early 1980s, they are now the dominant drivers of healthcare delivery.
Concomitantly, compare the amount of information (which I'm treating as a
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technology) available today to what was available 25 years ago. The
information that must potentially be disclosed to meet basic informed
consent requirements, let alone to facilitate the expansion of CDHC, is
staggering relative to 1983, and is unlikely to decrease any time soon.
Institutionally, much has changed since 1983, though perhaps not as
profoundly as the innovations noted in the previous paragraph. We were
already talking about vertically integrated health systems, with a multitude
of exclusive arrangements between health systems and physicians. Industry
consolidation since then has forced physicians to form cartels to bargain
with large systems and to invest in competing specialty centers. To be sure,
some things have, for the most part, remained unchanged. Access for
uninsured populations is probably worse now. The system remains
inefficient and costly, and many observers question the quality of care that
is delivered.
II. THE WEB OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Conflicts of interest remain an inevitable aspect of medical care, as they
are in any entrepreneurial activity. At its most basic level, as Marc Rodwin
has observed, medical care raises potential conflicts between a physician's
professional obligations to the patient and financial incentives.1 Yet the
conflicts of interest in the current healthcare delivery system are so
pervasive, and potentially disruptive, that they virtually form a general
organizing principle for teaching health law. In the managed care era, the
conflicts between an insurer's economic interests, the interests of plan
beneficiaries, and those of individual patients erupted. Those conflicts
remain unresolved.
Consider a few other examples.
The complex web between
pharmaceutical manufacturers and physicians, especially physicians
conducting clinical trials for new pharmaceuticals, is so entrenched that it is
the subject of numerous Inspector General opinions on illegal kickbacks
and questions regarding university oversight. An equally intractable issue
now is about physician ownership of specialty hospitals. Not only do
specialty hospitals compete with general hospitals for the most profitable
medical services, but physicians must choose between their economic
investment and what is best for the patient. And finally, a contentious
series of conflicts over conscience clauses (i.e., the right of a healthcare
provider to refuse certain services based on his or her moral beliefs)
remains unresolved.
A consistent pattern in these and similar conflicts is that legal doctrine
has not sufficiently evolved to mediate the conflicts or provide guidance for
1. Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Where is the "There" in Health Law? Can It
Become a CoherentField?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 103 (2006).
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non-litigious resolution. More to the point, if, as Carl Schneider and Mall
Hall have argued, an intricate web of personal relationships defines
healthcare law, the inevitability of conflicts of interest should not be
surprising. 2 I had hoped that fiduciary duty doctrine would emerge to fill
the gap, but courts have not effectively used fiduciary duty concepts beyond
the ERISA preemption context.
III. HEALTH LAW'S INCREASING INSTABILITY
In 2005, I wrote the following:
Health care is a field driven by fads. Just a few years ago, managed
competition was the solution to the system's deficiencies. Then it was
health insurance purchasing cooperatives, followed by business health
purchasing coalitions. Along the way, managed care emerged as the
ultimate solution. Each of those was exposed as flawed. Now the mantra
is consumer-driven health care. That, too, will be exposed as flawed and
another fad will emerge. All of this makes it difficult to establish
sustainable legal doctrine in health care. 3
Nothing occurring in the interim leads me to change my mind, and
nothing suggests greater stability going forward.
Regardless of what model of healthcare delivery emerges over the next
few years, courts will struggle to develop stable legal doctrine. All of the
factors discussed above militate against stability and predictability.
Nonetheless, there are some constants. First, it is likely that courts will
continue to defer to market arrangements. Second, if CDHC gains
momentum, courts will need to confront directly the tort-contract
conundrum, i.e., whether contract or tort principles will prevail in
determining medical liability for choices that patients make and for the
disclosure of information. Courts will also need to consider whether to
impose cost-effectiveness criteria or allow costs to be a defense in medical
liability litigation. Perhaps more problematic will be to observe how
medical professional norms evolve when physicians recommend treatments
that patients cannot afford or are not covered by insurance. Third, cost
versus access was a central theme in managed care litigation and will be no
less salient in CDHC litigation.
IV. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF LAW TO HEALTHCARE DELIVERY

By 1983, there was little doubt that understanding the legal implications
2. See Peter D. Jacobson and Michael T. Cahill, Redefining FiduciaryResponsibilities in
the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J. OF LAW & MED. 155-174 (2000).
3. Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005: An Agenda, 33 J. OF LAW, MED., AND ETHICs
725, 736 (2005).
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was an important aspect of healthcare administration, far beyond the
medical liability issues that dominated health law in the 1960s and early
1970s. At this point, law is so pervasive that healthcare administrators can
make very few strategic decisions without considering the legal
ramifications. For example, joint ventures between non-profit health
systems and for-profit physician groups are essential for generating revenue
in a tight economic environment. But sophisticated joint ventures raise
contractual, antirust, fraud and abuse, and tax questions that require legal
involvement from the outset.
Equally important, the regulatory environment is increasingly stifling
and oppressive. In particular, the current fraud and abuse regime impedes
legitimate market arrangements and transactions that would benefit patients.
Estimates of the regulatory burden on health administration vary, but are
non-trivial in any event. As a proponent of regulation, I have no problem
with imposing regulatory costs on healthcare delivery. But those costs
should bear some relationship to measurable benefits. At this point, it
appears that the costs far outweigh the undeniable benefits. Regulatory
reform should be high on the congressional agenda.
Thus, one constant of the past twenty-five years is the omnipresence of
law as a major factor in health care. That is not going away, and indeed
will continue apace. Whatever healthcare reform legislation emerges from
Congress will only exacerbate this trend. As just one example, physicians
will continue to invest in specialty surgical centers to the disadvantage of
competing health systems. In response, health systems will continue to
retaliate against physicians. Eventually we will reach equilibrium, and legal
doctrine will be an important contributor, if nothing else, by setting the
parameters of the debate.
But as important as law is to the healthcare enterprise (and to public
health delivery as well), it is important to recognize the limits of what legal
regimes can achieve in a complex and rapidly changing industry such as
health care. One need not be a confirmed libertarian to suggest that
academics should assess the limits of law along with its force. For
example, many commentators (especially Tim Greaney) have observed that
antitrust enforcement has failed to curtail the increasing consolidation of
healthcare markets;4 that is no doubt true. At the same time, is it realistic to
expect that even robust antitrust activity could have prevented the
consolidation? At best, antirust enforcement might have slowed the
consolidation. But given the economic and other factors driving health

4.
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markets toward consolidation, it is difficult to see how antitrust alone could
have prevented it from occurring.
V. GOING FORWARD

Recognizing that a coherent theory of health law is unlikely, is there a
clear direction for health law doctrine to take? Over the next few years, we
will have the opportunity to observe whether CDHC dominates health
insurance and delivery, and how the health insurance reform legislation
affects the healthcare delivery model. Law will play a significant role in
how these facets evolve. As with the transition to managed care, law can
facilitate the underlying market arrangements or it can impede them. The
contribution academics can make is to articulate where regulatory policy
can facilitate these transitions and how the courts should think about CDHC
litigation.
Less than a theory of health law, which is what animates legal
academics, we need a pragmatics of health law, a sense of the role of law in
shaping and, yes, constraining, the powerful tendencies in the healthcare
marketplace to subordinate patient welfare to economic gain. The
pragmatics of health law need not be a-theoretical. Quite the contrary, it
should be based on sound conceptual and theoretical foundations. Where it
differs from a normative theory of health law is that it understands the role
of law in the everyday strategic decisions health administrators make.
Standing alone, even if one could be imagined, a theory of health law is
somewhat orthogonal to the health care enterprise.
The pragmatics of health law approach is uncomfortably close to Judge
Richard Posner's pragmatic jurisprudence.
As Posner defines it,
''pragmatism refers to basing a judicial decision on the effects the decision
is likely to have, rather than on the language of a statute or a case, or more
generally on a preexisting rule."5 Although it is not what I mean to convey,
I do not have a better term for it at this point. What I have in mind is to
extend the Schneider-Hall insight about relationships to a concept of health
law that could balance the conflicting tensions inherent in a relationship
approach. At the heart of medical care is the physician-patient relationship.
But in many judicial opinions, the patient seems to get lost amidst the
various actors. How can courts, regulators, and legislators return patient
concerns to the center of the legal response? At one point, I thought that
fiduciary duty might be an effective organizing principle. However, while
fiduciary duty is a necessary component of health pragmatics, it is not a
sufficient approach.
Another possibility is some convergence of population health concepts

5.
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with health care legal doctrine. For the most part, health law and public
health law have been treated as separate and distinct realms. For a variety
of reasons, that separation is likely to change, and future health law
doctrinal developments will be infused with public health law concepts, and
vice versa. Take obesity as an example. Without question, obese
individuals require considerable medical treatment, so that medical
necessity decisions generate considerable litigation. At the same time,
obesity is a public health epidemic, requiring traditional public health
intervention strategies.
The intersection between the two doctrinal
approaches presents health law scholars with an opportunity to integrate
public health into health law doctrine. Doing so will be challenging, but
doctrinal convergence can benefit both health care and public health
delivery.
VI. CONCLUSION

For healthcare administrators and physicians, the law is a nuisance-an
intrusive and costly impediment to the healthcare mission. For health law
scholars, these are exciting times. The proposed health insurance reform
legislation raises fascinating constitutional and regulatory questions.
Separate and apart from congressional action, the healthcare delivery
system is likely to undergo significant change over the next decade. Its
current form is no more stable than the law that responds to the inevitable
changes. If one is looking for stability in the relationship between law and
an industry, health care is the last place to find it. That is fine with me.
Doctrinal instability is much more fun!
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